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To my fellow schmoozers: It’s Monday 2/28, 1:30 a.m. and I’m sending off what I have.
The first ten or twelve pages are more or less complete, but after that (as you will see),
it’s more of a detailed outline. Still, I think you will be able to see the flow of the
argument, and I look forward to your feedback.

Introduction
Over the past twenty-five years, the “judicial turn” that began in Europe in the
wake of World War II has spread to almost all corners of the globe (Cappelletti 1971;
Tate and Vallinder 1994). In established and emerging democracies alike, parliamentary
sovereignty is in decline and constitutional courts with broad powers have become
commonplace (Scheppele 2000; Stone Sweet 2000; Ginsburg 2003; Hirschl 2004). As
Ginsburg (2003: 3 and 6) notes, “Judicial review…has made strong inroads in those
systems where it was previously alleged to be anathema,” and where new constitutions
are being drafted, “providing for a system of constitutional review is now a norm.”
Although the formal introduction of judicial review mechanisms does not necessarily
translate to an energetic assertion of judicial authority in all places (O’Brien and Okoshi
1996; Couso YEAR), it is certainly true that in many polities, courts now play an
unprecedented role in the policy making process (Stone Sweet 2000; Scheppele 2001;
Guarnieri and Pederzoli 2002; Hirschl, resituating article).
Perhaps not surprisingly, normative responses to the rise of the new
constitutionalism among Anglo/American-trained scholars of law and courts have
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followed the contours of the debate over judicial review in the United States, splitting
generally between liberal enthusiasm and democratic dismay. Enthusiasts view courts as
an important mechanism for protecting citizens’ rights, and their strengthening thus as a
positive step toward securing a meaningful and sustainable democracy (Dworkin 1990;
Ackerman 1997; Scheppele 2001). Opponents see judicial empowerment as a move
away from popular self-determination and away from policymaking in the interest of the
masses (Tushnet 1999; Morton and Knopff 2000; Hirschl 2004). While the former tend
to idealize judges and the role they play in a constitutional democracy, the latter err in the
opposition direction, vilifying judges as agents of the elite.
In this paper, I advocate moving beyond this binary perspective, emphasizing that
the substantive role judges play in a democratic regime depends on a whole host of
factors not captured by either the sunny liberal or the skeptical democratic views. While
the radical democrats1 are correct to warn that the spread of judicial review is not
necessarily a boon for democracy, I find their cynicism to be as simplistic and sweeping
as the unbridled enthusiasm of the liberals. Judicial behavior and influence is not a
given; it is shaped by numerous factors, including but not limited to the institutional
characteristics of the legal and political systems, which furnish judges (and the legislators
they interact with) with particular understandings and incentives. Rather than insisting,
then, that the global rise of constitutionalism must be a wholesale good or bad thing, then,
we should seek to identify the conditions under which judges in different countries have
proven more or less willing and able to behave in ways supportive of democracy. The
international diffusion of bills of rights and judicial review offers us an unprecedented
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I adapt this term from Dyzenhaus’s (1999) discussion.
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opportunity to build empirically-informed arguments that will move us beyond the stark,
essentializing claims of the established debate.

Judges: Heroes or Anti-heroes?
Until World War II, most of the world’s democracies rejected judicial review as a
peculiar and highly conservative American institution, unacceptable in any polity
committed to popular sovereignty. Only government officers whose tenure was subject
to electoral control possessed the legitimacy to determine what the law was, or to
determine any substantive limits thereto. In many cases, this translated to a strong
commitment to “parliamentary sovereignty.”2 However, “when the Nazi-Fascist era
shook this faith in the legislature, people began to reconsider the judiciary as a check
against legislative disregard of [fundamental democratic] principles” (Cappelletti
1971:viii). In the “second wave” of global democratization that followed WWII, then,
new constitutions were written to entrench rights principles, and, in places like Italy,
Germany, and Japan, courts were empowered to review the decisions of elected officials
for compliance with these principles. In the years that followed, the appeal of the
American model grew (largely in response to the activism of the Warren Court3), the
German Constitutional Court acquired its own prestige, and the international human
rights movement expanded, such that by the time the “third wave” of democratization
began in the mid-1970s (Huntington 1991), judicial review had become a central element
of new “democratic” constitutions (Scheppele 2000; Ginsburg 2003).
2

I say “many,” because there were also presidentialist systems, as in Latin America, where law-making
power was split between the executive and legislature, and often dominated by the former, be it de jure or
de facto.
3 The role of the Supreme Court in the American “rights revolution” has been disputed (Rosenberg 1991).
Rightly or wrongly, though, its image/reputation did travel. (NEED TO FLESH THIS OUT.)
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Notable American liberal theorists responded to these developments with great
enthusiasm, encouraging new and old democracies alike to embrace the promise of
judicial review, and chiding U.S.-based skeptics for being largely indifferent to or out of
step with the international trend. For example, Ronald Dworkin, the standard-bearer for
active judicial rights protection, made his approval clear when he wrote in 1990 in favor
of the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into British domestic
law and the empowerment of British judges to interpret and apply it against statutes
passed by the parliament. He claimed not only that such incorporation would help
cultivate (or re-invigorate) a “culture of liberty” in Britain, but also that it would be in no
way incompatible with a correct or “true” understanding of democracy. He wrote:
[T]rue democracy is not just statistical democracy, in which anything a
majority or plurality wants is legitimate for that reason, but communal
democracy, in which majority decision is legitimate only if it is a majority
within a community of equals….[P]olitical decisions must treat everyone
with equal concern and respect, that [is,] each individual person must be
guaranteed fundamental civil and political rights no combination of other
citizens can take away, no matter how numerous they are or how much
they despise his or her race or morals or way of life…That view of what
democracy means is at the heart of all the charters of human rights,
including the European Convention. It is now the settled concept of
democracy…, the mature, principled concept that has now triumphed
throughout Western Europe [and] North America (Dworkin 1990:PAGE).
In a similar spirit, Bruce Ackerman (1997) claimed that “the Enlightenment hope in
written constitutions is sweeping the world,” (772) and that the future of liberal
democracy looked bright since “when judges intervene, they tend to operate on behalf of
internationally-recognized norms of human dignity” (790-1).
This celebration of constitutionalism’s spread did not go unchallenged, however.
Indeed, towards the end of the 1990s, a number of highly skeptical, in some cases
downright cynical, works emerged challenging the value of judicial review both in theory
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and practice (Kennedy 1997; Waldron 1999; Tushnet 1999; Morton and Knopff 2000;
Dahl 2001; Hirschl 2004). Reviving the older (and in some circles, persistent) concerns
about the “counter-majoritarian difficulty” (Bickel 1986) or the “gouvernement des
juges” (CITE), these authors attacked the liberal enthusiasts as, at best, naïve idealists or,
at worst, disingenuous elitists. These “radical democrats” (Dyznehaus 1999) hold that
because definitions of and relationships between rights can never be settled definitively,
any liberal society will have the difficult task of resolving such matters; but to delegate
this task to a small, unelected, tenured set of individuals (high court judges) is an affront
to the most basic principle of democracy: political equality. While they accept that rights
protection, even beyond that necessary to the democratic process (Ely 1980), is integral
to democracy, they object to the delegation of the power to define and protect rights to an
unelected (and hence unaccountable) elite.4
While most of these works build their arguments in the abstract or with a single
country as the empirical referent,5 Ran Hirschl’s (2004) book stands out for its attempt to
ground its claims in an explicitly comparative study. Taking the liberal triumphalists to
task for failing to ground their claims in comparative, empirical data, Hirschl offers a
critical analysis of the origins and impact of constitutionalization in four countries (Israel,
Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa). His central claim is that both the motivations
for and the consequences of the introduction of bills of rights (BORs) and judicial review
have been gravely misunderstood by many observers. Far from being a reflection of
“these polities’ genuine commitment to entrenched, self-binding protection of basic rights
4

Waldron (1999: 309) even goes so far as to characterize the U.S. Supreme Court as “a nine man junta clad
in black robes and surrounded by law clerks.”
5 Dahl (2001) is an exception, as his goal is to try to show how poorly the U.S. performs on a number of
measures of democratic performance. However, while he discusses judicial review, assessing the
independent effect thereof is not his main focus.
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and civil liberties” for vulnerable groups and individuals (p. 2), he argues, the
constitutionalist reforms have been part of “an essentially self-serving agenda” (p. 99) on
the part of social and economic elites who see their prerogatives threatened in the
electoral sphere. (NEED TO SAY A BIT MORE…)
The increased level of involvement (he would say intervention) by courts in the policy
making process should not be celebrated by those who care about justice, but rather
condemned. Does not represent humanitarian progress, but rather victory for narrowly
self-interested elites. Why?
•

Reps a “wholesale transfer” of policy making to insulated, professional policymaking bodies, favoring those with disproportionate understanding of, access to
and influence on those bodies (i.e., the elite) p. 186

•

Judges will tend to adopt “uninhibited Lockean individualism” in their
interpretations, throwing support behind anti-statism/neoliberalism, and thereby
increasing control of dominant elites (and exacerbating inequality) 151

•

Removes fundamental political decisions from hands of elected officials (or
allows them to abdicate power), thereby stunting political debate/democratic
deliberation, discouraging citizen participation, and further disempowering “the
people.”p. 186
In sum, Hirschl argues that with the introduction of bills of rights and judicial

review, “They the Jurists are granted an elevated status in determining policy outcomes at
the expense of We the People, laypersons who make up the vast majority of the
population” (p. 187).
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These constitute very strong, generalizing claims about the new constitutionalism,
all of which Hirschl claims are bolstered by the empirical evidence he offers in the book.
Were this a book review, this would be the place for me to pull out specific examples of
where and how the data he offers do or do not support his arguments. However, my
purpose here is not so much to take issue with the strength of his evidence or with the
particular interpretation he offers of the constitutional revolutions in his four cases
(though this can and should be done). Rather, in the pages that follow, I seek to
challenge some of the more sweeping statements or assumptions that he makes as he
steps back from his cases and assesses the “new constitutionalism” in general, as well as
to suggest areas for further empirical inquiry.6

Government of Judges or Governing With Judges7?
The premise of Hirschl’s (2004) book is that unrepresentative and unaccountable
judges are usurping democratic decision making around the world, dramatically
diminishing the role played by citizens and legislatures. Indeed, he opens the book by
stating that “over the past few years the world has witnessed an astonishingly rapid
transition” to what he subsequently dubs a “new political order: juristocracy” (p. 1 and p.
222). If this is indeed the case, anybody who claims to care at all about democracy
should be seriously alarmed. But how plausible is this claim?

6

I don’t mean to pick on Hirschl, but since he has thrown down the gauntlet regarding the need for public
law theorists to ground their claims empirically, I make him the target of my critique below. Obviously,
the criticisms don’t apply only to him (see esp. the conclusion of this paper).
7 I borrow this second formulation (“governing with judges”) from the title of Stone Sweet (2000).
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How Insulated Are High Court Judges in NC Countries?
Hirschl’s central argument is based on a stark distinction between courts as
“insulated,…semi-autonomous, professional policy-making bodies,” on the one hand, and
legislatures as faithful mirrors of popular will, on the other. Following other radical
democratic theorists, he casts judges as unrepresentative, unaccountable members (or
agents) of the social elite, and elected officials as responsive and responsible delegates of
average citizens. However, he devotes little attention to how judicial selection and tenure
work in his four focus cases, much less anywhere else, and he offers no systematic
discussion of legislative structure and representativeness in the four countries.8
Hirschl offers the most information about selection and composition of the high
court for the Israeli case, and it is to that case that his argument perhaps best applies. As
he explains, justices to Israel’s high court (in fact, to all of the nation’s courts) are
appointed by a nine-member appointments committee, composed of three sitting high
court judges, two representatives from the Israeli Bar Association, two members of the
Knesset chosen by majority through a secret ballot, and two ministers, one of whom is
the Minister of Justice (Hirschl 2004: 66). Hence, as Hirschl himself notes, the process is
formally depoliticized; that is, there is no explicit procedure (be it an institutional rule or
informal norm) for achieving any measure of political party, ethnic, gender, or religious
representation on the high court, except for a customary chair reserved for a religious
justice, which Hirschl notes was, until recently, only honored in the breach (p. 67). Not
surprisingly, then, the SCI (Supreme Court of Israel) has tended to reproduce itself over
the years, such that “of the thirty-six judges who served on the Court during the country’s
8

It would have been nice, for example, to have some tables showing the change over time in the four
countries of both ascriptive (race/ethnicity, religion, gender) and party representation (explicit or implicit)
in the legislature and on the high court.
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first forty-five years, all were Jews and thirty were Ashkenazi,” and decisions have
overwhelmingly favored secularist views (pp. 66-7).9
This practice appears to reflect an American-style understanding of constitutional
law as analogous to ordinary law (Griffin 1996). In Israel, as in the U.S., the high court
has (at least since the introduction of the Basic Laws), a dual function: it has jurisdiction
over both ordinary cases and cases involving constitutional questions. In other words,
constitutional law is just another form of law, and constitutional adjudication requires
from judges no more and no less than ordinary adjudication. This is not the way it works
in most new constitutionalist (NC) countries, however.
In many NC countries, reformers have recognized the deeply political nature of
constitutional decision making, and have established formal institutional mechanisms
and/or informal norms to ensure that judges who decide constitutional cases have a
(much) higher level of representative legitimacy than ordinary judges. Indeed, in the NC
countries of continental Europe, which share the civil law tradition, constitutional courts
are often not even considered part of the judiciary. Because of their obvious legislative
function (constitutional decision making cannot but involve law making, even if it is in a
negative sense (Kelsen YEAR)), constitutional courts in the civil law world have been
constructed completely separate from, and sometimes in tension with, the ordinary
judiciary. While the ordinary judiciary is conceived as a civil service bureaucracy, whose
function it is to be the “mouthpiece of the law,” constitutional courts are (rightly)
understood as institutions whose function is fundamentally political (not partisan; but
definitely not “neutral”) (Favoureu YEAR?; Stone Sweet 2000). Thus, the appointment
9

For an in-depth analysis of how another autonomous, bureaucratic judiciary reproduced conservatism and
conformity in the judicial ranks, favoring the traditional elite, see my work on Chile (Hilbink 1999, 2003,
and forthcoming).
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rules for constitutional courts in the civil law world allow explicitly for political
negotiation and aim at political inclusion.
For example, half of the members of the sixteen-member German Constitutional
Court are chosen by a twelve-person Judicial Selection Committee of the Bundestag
(lower house). The committee’s membership is determined by proportional
representation, and the committee must propose a slate of candidates for up or down
approval by the Bundestag assembly. The other eight justices are chosen by the
Bundesrat (upper house), composed of delegates from provincial governments, who must
approve candidates by a 2/3 vote. As Helms (2000: 87) notes, “almost from the very
beginning there has been a strong attempt [on the part of the two major parties] at
establishing a consociational system of nominating judges to the Court.” While never
perfectly representative, the appointment process has brought in enough actors to achieve
rough balances in partisan, religious, and geographic representation (Kommers 1997:
PAGE).
Hungary, whose post-Communist reformers followed closely the German model,
also uses a committee composed of one representative from each party in parliament to
handle Constitutional Court nominations, and requires 2/3 approval by the full assembly.
The political parties are thus the principal players in Constitutional Court appointments
(Körösényi 1999).
South Africa, meanwhile, which has been influenced by both the common and
civil law traditions, has a Judicial Services Commission (JSC) that integrates
representatives from the legislature (10 total, 6 chosen by the National Assembly and 4
from the National Council of Provinces), the executive (5, four chosen by the President in

11
consultation with all the party leaders represented in the National Assembly, plus the
Minister of Justice), the judiciary (3, including the Chief Justice and the President of the
Constitutional Court), and the bar (4 practicing lawyers and one law professor). The JSC
prepares a list of nominees with three names more than the number of appointments to be
made (to the Constitutional Court or any other court), and the President makes
appointments from the list. The Constitution stipulates that “The need for the judiciary to
reflect broadly the racial and gender composition of South Africa must be considered
when judicial officers are appointed” (Section 174).
Even in Canada, where the executive has control over all judicial appointments,
there is, as Hirschl (2004: 80) notes, “a provincially representative formula” for Supreme
Court appointments, guaranteeing three justices from Ontario, three from Québec, two
from the western provinces, and one from the Maritime provinces.10
All of these procedures reflect a recognition of the crucial, and ultimately
political, role that judges with constitutional decision making authority play in a liberal
democracy, and I submit that they mitigate somewhat (albeit not entirely) the “insulated”
and unrepresentative nature of these courts. Moreover, with the exception of Canada, in
all of the systems just discussed, constitutional court judges do not serve for life. In
Germany and South Africa, they serve twelve-year, non-renewable terms. In Hungary,
the terms are nine years and renewable. In addition, all three countries have a mandatory
retirement age for judges: 68 in Germany, 70 in South Africa, and XX in Hungary (ask
Kim). Even Canada requires that its judges step down at 75. Thus, it is far less likely in
these countries than it is in the United States (for example) that judges will be grossly

10

I could go on with other examples, and maybe I could provide a table for a published version of the
paper.
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out-of-step with the rest of the political system, representing perspectives that have been
long since rejected by strong popular majorities.
As this small sampling of judicial appointment and tenure rules demonstrates, the
degree of insulation/remove from politics that high court judges enjoy varies from
country to country, such that not all judges everywhere are equally unrepresentative or
unaccountable. Granted, high court judges never have to answer directly to voters, and,
even in the stingiest countries, they enjoy term lengths that elected officials can only
dream about. However, the fact that they do not face elections is often considered
enabling: because they don’t have to cater to constituents with particular demands, they
are freer to decide cases on principle than a legislator, who must keep one eye always on
the polls (Cropsey YEAR?; Eisgruber 2001). Moreover, no assessment of a political
institution’s representativeness should be done in a vacuum; honest scholars must
evaluate the relative levels of representation (ascriptive, class, party, etc.) and
accountability for all branches of government, including the legislature, over time. As
Scheppele (2001) argues, in certain times and places, one might even be able to argue
that courts have been more representative of and accountable to “the people” than have
legislatures.

Are Judges Really Usurping Policy Making Power?
The second assumption that Hirschl makes, or at least asks his readers to make, is
that the undeniable increase in judicial involvement in political decision making in the
past several decades means that the direct representatives of the people, the elected
legislators, have been increasingly sidelined. In this “zero-sum” view, one institution’s
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gain is, by definition, another’s loss. Once again, I submit that this is a perspective that
those most familiar with the U.S. case might accept, but that doesn’t apply equally to all
NC countries. Because the U.S. Constitution is considered to be analogous to ordinary
law (Griffin 1996), it is the “province and the duty” of the judiciary to say what it means
(Marbury v. Madison), and once the high court has spoken, the matter is settled, or so the
justices, and many of their supporters, would have it (Cooper v. Aaron; City of Boerne).
If instead the executive or the legislature had the power to overrule the Court, to assert an
independent interpretation of the Constitution, the reasoning goes, then the Constitution’s
status as law would end, and there would be little point in having a written constitution
(Marbury v. Madison).
This is not exactly the way constitutionalism is conceived and practiced, however,
in other polities.11 Although constitutions are almost always written today, they are not
always treated as super codes or statutes to be rigidly applied by technically trained and
expert judges. Indeed, in a number of NC countries, there are explicit invitations for
judges to engage in value balancing, meaning the text is not always absolute and
adjudication is explicitly not that distinct from legislation (Canada-sec. 1 of Charter;
South Africa-sec. 36 of Const’n). While this might seem an odd defense against the
charge that in these polities judges are filling in where legislators should be, my argument
is that this kind of constitutional language permits greater transparency on the part of
judges, encouraging them to speak in terms understandable to average citizens about the
competing values at stake, rather than, as can happen in the United States, asserting a
“correct” and absolute meaning of some clause or another that judges to which judges
somehow have unique access. Moreover, some NC countries provide explicit
11

And many would say this does not accurately capture the U.S. practice either (e.g., Friedman YEAR).
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mechanisms for legislative override (Canada, Britain, technically Israel, OTHERS?),
meaning that if judges rule in a way deemed sufficiently outrageous to the (simple!)
legislative majority, they can be overruled. Hence, rather than playing a “trumping”
function, asserting their superior position and shutting out the legislature, high court
judges in a number of NC countries might instead be viewed as participating in and
(arguably) nurturing a polity-wide constitutional dialogue (Hogg and Bushell 1997; Stone
Sweet 2000).12 CAN AND WILL SAY MORE HERE…
Even in places where there is no provision for a simple majority legislative
override, amendment rules tend to be far more easily met than in the United States (cite
Griffin 1996: U.S. requires “virtual unanimity”). NEED TO FLESH OUT WITH
EXAMPLES HERE… So if courts get really out of line (and for strategic reasons, they
are unlikely to do so --as Hirschl admits), this option is more realistic than in the U.S.13
Finally, Hirschl emphasizes the use of courts by politicians to AVOID deciding
things they know will be unpopular. But courts are channels that can be used by citizens
as well as politicians (that elected officials might perpetually ignore some issue that the
courts MUST address, thereby forcing a debate/increasing deliberation…cite Scheppele
on Hungary, Smulovitz on Argentina, Klug on South Africa, etc.); Discuss standing…I
think Hirschl does acknowledge this at some point, but doesn’t dwell on it, since it
doesn’t help his argument…NEED TO FLESH THIS OUT A LOT MORE….

12

Overrides may not be exercised regularly, but the fact that they are not indicates either that politicians
don’t see it in their interest to assert them (they would pay an electoral price for doing so) OR that there are
barriers to cooperation within the legislature…somehow majority preferences are not getting translated into
majority action in legislature (and this inability to reach simple majority consensus problematizes the
judicial elite minority/legislative popular minority assumption).
13 There is, in some countries, the thornier issue of “unconstitutional constitutional amendments”
(Germany, South Africa, India), which really does set the Court up as “guardians,” BUT, again, judges
don’t inherit their positions, there is the political check and limit on who they are (they are not as
“unguarded” as even SCOTUS is).
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In sum, just as a slightly more detailed look at judicial selection and tenure rules
weakens the claim that high court judges everywhere are insulated and unrepresentative,
a brief consideration of the variation in the way the role of the high court is constructed
and limited in different countries throws into doubt the claim that judges everywhere are
brandishing constitutions to impose their will on legislatures. Indeed, a more accurate
critique of constitutional decision making by judges might be NOT that they are
frustrating/trumping majorities, but that they fail to protect minorities. (After all, Hirschl
is incorrect to argue that constzn is sold as a means to greater socio-economic
equality/social justice; in fact, it is explicitly advertised as a means for protecting
MINORITY rights. Actually, he starts out saying this, but shifts away from it almost
immediately.) If it is true, as Dahl (1957) notes, that because of the judicial selection
process, the American judiciary/SC tends to reflect the interests of the dominant political
coalition, the logic should apply even more strongly in many of the NC countries, where
judicial tenure is shorter and judicial appointment more openly politicized/politically
determined. A rigorous comparative empirical analysis of how and why courts respond
to rights claims by historically or structurally disadvantaged minorities versus how they
respond to rights claims by social elites might be very revealing (Hirschl doesn’t do this,
because he sets it up as negative vs. positive rights claims), but evidence of failure to
protect such minorities would not support the claim that democracy (majority rule) is
losing ground to juristocracy; rather, it would reveal an inability on the part of courts to
challenge dominant views and policies, revealing the ultimate triumph of
democracy/politics over law.
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Ironically, Hirschl provides more evidence(of an anecdotal sort) for this than for
his claim that courts are undermining democracy:
Israel: Court refuses/fails to protect either the Orthodox minority (174-8) or Arab
minority (137-8)…its rulings seem pretty majoritarian, and those opposed seem to be
intense minorities (he even uses the terms ‘radical right’ and ‘extreme right-wing’ 72-3).
Canada: Court has been inconsistent in its protection of aboriginal peoples (1968) and Francophones (178-82) (not zealous defenders), accommodating them within the
parameters favored by the national political elite
South Africa: AZAPO decision against Biko relatives et al (192) and for dominant
parties/leg; several decisions favoring national policy against (white elite!) claims (1834).

So question is: if courts do not offer reliable protection for these kinds of
minorities (and this still needs to be established), then what valued added is there to
introducing judicial review?

The Proof Is in the Eating
If “They the Jurists” are not entirely usurping the power of “We the People” (as
Hirschl would have it), or if the distinction between “They the Jurists” and “We the
People” is overdrawn in the first place (assuming none of the countries in question is in a
position to introduce direct democracy), then we get to the heart of the matter, “the proof
in the eating.”
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SO, Are the substance of judicial decisions in BOR cases fundamentally at odds with or
necessarily secondary to democratic principles (equal respect and dignity; human
dignity)? Let’s look at Hirschl’s evidence…
Although some of his evidence seems to point to a failure to advance the interests
of historically disadvantaged or permanent ethnic/religious minorities, Hirschl actually
shows that the contribution of courts in NC countries is not negligible. Total success rate
in cases involving negative rights is high, ranging from 39% to 55%. No breakdown as
to what percentage of these were economic cases, but even Hirschl is forced to concede
that there is something positive here (due process rights, gay rights, etc.) p. 122 and p.
137ish..reduces social injustice p. 168: “constitutionalization of rights does have crucial
importance in affirming marginalized identities and enhancing the status of individual
freedoms”
((This data is perhaps the most valuable contribution of the book; hope it is publicly
available, and hope other scholars will contribute to building similar databases for other
country cases.)
Radical democrats/populists like Hirschl (or Waldron or Tushnet) tend to reject
liberalism outright, in my view throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Even if one
believes the state has a role to play in regulating the economy and redistributing wealth
through taxation and social services, one can still find value in “negative rights”
protection. As millions of people around the world who have suffered under
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes will attest, bodily integrity, due process, and free
association, assembly, and expression are nothing to turn one’s nose up at. Hence,
evidence that courts in (at least four) NC countries are providing relatively high levels of
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negative rights protection (at least in terms of their decisions; enforcement is another
matter) should come as welcome news for those with humanitarian concerns. This is
more liberal than democratic, but most people would refuse to separate the two today,
and are content to live with the tensions and trade-offs between individual rights of this
kind and collective self-determination.
As for positive rights outcomes, more evidence is needed. Where the constitution
most strongly protects positive rights (S. Africa in Hirschl, but also E. European/former
Soviet cases), courts have actually been quite responsive. Success rate of positive rights
claims in South Africa was 45%! So whether courts are inherently hostile to positive
rights is unclear. Indeed, Hirschl himself acknowledges that where social rights are more
explicitly protected in constitutional texts, reflecting a “more progressive social ideology
147” (Canada and S. Africa), courts demonstrate to a lesser degree a “narrow conception
of rights, emphasizing uninhibited Lockean individualism and…antistatis[m].” 146
Actually, I think it is quite striking that they have been able to this in an “age of
neoliberalism” 218.

Having said that, it is still possible that turning to courts to enforce positive rights
is inefficient/ineffective. Hirschl 298: channeling pressures for social justice to courts
“has a considerable potential to harm reformist social movements by pacifying activists
with illusions of change by luring resources away from political processes and lobbying
strategies through which more substantial change might be achieved.” This is possible,
but begs investigation.
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Also, any gains in terms of judicial rights protection might still be outweighed by
costs in terms of other measures of democratic quality. For example, one might ask: Has
judicial intervention in the policy making process precluded or undermined progressive
reform legislation, stunted or stifled debate in civil or political society, or otherwise
prevented equally or more desirable outcomes from being realized? (Note assumption of
radical democrats is that without judicial review, both the majority and minorities (“the
people”) would be better off; there would be both much richer deliberation and more
justice.) To my knowledge, nobody to date, including Hirschl, has tackled these
questions for countries outside the U.S. (FN: obviously lots on Lochner era; Rosenberg;
Lovell?; maybe Lisa Conant for EU??...but article on US and England? Suggestions
from fellow schmoozers?) Requires very close, historical analysis, examining such
sources as congressional/legislative records, media coverage, etc. to look for clear
quantitative and qualitative declines in legislative debate, press coverage, civil society
mobilization that can be plausibly linked to the introduction of judicial
review/”judicialization of politics.” Need also to be able to construct credible
counterfactual accounts (Fearon) about the likelihood that the absence of judicial
involvement would have resulted in better outcomes, paired with a compelling normative
argument for why these hypothetical outcomes would really have been superior (and not
just a trade-off).

Conclusion: Beyond Manicheanism
Both sides in the debate over constitutionalism/judicial review tend to portray the
issues at stake in binary terms (need to rethink the order here, but possibilities include:)
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i.

Judges vs. Legislators: heroic, principled vs. venal, selfinterested…or vice-versa: disdainful elitists vs. authentic reps;

ii.

Principles/Ideals vs. Interests/Mere preferences: Dworkin guiltier
here…as if judges are above the fray; at the same time, Hirschl is
too cynical: since origins aren’t uniquely noble, they must be
uniquely self-interested.

iii.

Law vs. Politics: constraint/objectivity vs.
discretion/subjectivity/value choices…to be legitimate, judges
must do the former; to admit they do the latter is to give up on
judicial review (Waldron/Hirschl 188).

iv.

Legal vs. Political questions…Hirschl, at least, accepts this
dichotomy, implying that there are questions that are clearly
“political” (or moral) and not legal (192, 198, 211), and therefore
should only be decided by elected officials or “the people.”

v.

Zero-sum view of policy making…By definition for Hirschl, any
increase in judicial involvement is a loss for “democracy.” But
Dworkin, too: principle vs. policy!

But, in fact, there is nothing “essential” about con interp…and simplistic, sweeping
responses to constzn of ALL STRIPES, sunny and skeptical, should be rejected (218).

Are we witnessing the creation of a “new political order” called juristocracy? No; there
has clearly been a growing involvement of courts in the policy making process in
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numerous polities, but, even the countries with the highest levels of judicialization of
politics are a long way from having judges dominate and control policy making.
Hyperbole.
In most countries, it is inaccurate to characterize high court judges as insulated and aloof
technocrats or self-appointed philosopher-kings; they have a democratic pedigree and, in
many NC countries, are not set above the legislative process, but are rather an integral
part thereof…not necessarily short-circuiting or shutting off debate.

Should we be troubled by the expansion of the judicial role? Maybe; but political
scientists have a long way to go before we will have the data necessary to draw this
conclusion.

Where to put?: Hirschl 198-9: the legal system is “inherently pacifying” and “pro-statusquo;” “inherently more conservative” than the “potentially open-ended political
sphere.”This is true, in general. Certainly, social revolution will never happen through
legal means (as Allende sadly discovered). But not all legal systems are equally
conservative, and it is possible to have reform, even progressive reform, be supported by
judges (pace Rosenberg…not protagonists of social change). Moreover, not all “status
quos” are the same…where social rights are part of the “status quo,” or the prevailing
ethos of a society, it is even likely that judges will support them.

In all likelihood, there are and always will be too many variations from case to case to
make sweeping (universalizing) normative claims. There may be no such thing as (the
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“real nature of 21st century constitutional democracy” 218). Rather, as Hirschl says in the
conclusion to his book: “Judicial interpretation and implementation of constitutional
rights depend to a large extent on the ideological atmosphere, specific institutional
constraints, and economic and social meta-conditions within which they operate.” I
couldn’t agree more. So let’s get down to the business of trying to figure out what
matters most. Hirschl has thrown down the gauntlet; let’s rise to the challenge.
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